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ESSAY 
PLEASANT GROVE V. SUMMUM: LOSING THE BATTLE TO WIN 
THE WAR 
Ian Bartrum*
N February, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous decision in 
a case that represents the first step in a well calculated attack on the 
conservative wing’s efforts to conflate Establishment Clause doctrine 
with Free Speech analysis. The case, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. 
Summum, pitted a Salt Lake City church headed by Summum Ra against 
the city of Pleasant Grove in a fight over monuments displayed in a 
public park.1 For over thirty years, a monument of the Ten 
Commandments—originally donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles—
has stood in the city’s Pioneer Park. In 2003, and again in 2005, 
Summum asked Pleasant Grove also to display a monument dedicated to 
the “Seven Aphorisms of Summum” on park grounds.2 The city rejected 
Summum’s request, claiming that monuments in the park must have 
some significant connection to Pleasant Grove’s civic history. Summum, 
however, argued that, by opening Pioneer Park to privately donated 
monuments, the city has created a public forum for free expression 
purposes and cannot now discriminate against donations based on their 
content. In a forceful display of unanimity from a Court that might have 
fractured along a number of doctrinal lines, Summum lost—for now. 
I 
Samuel Alito’s majority opinion makes the decision out as a 
straightforward application of the government speech rule, which 
 
* Irving S. Ribicoff Fellow in Law, Yale Law School. 
1 Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
2 Id. at 1129–30. 
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permits the state to formulate and express its own opinions without also 
having to present any and all others. In one court’s words, if “authorities 
place a statute [sic] of Ulysses S. Grant in [a] park, the First Amendment 
does not require them also to install a statue of Robert E. Lee.”3 This 
rule hinges, of course, on whether or not it is in fact the government 
speaking; the doctrine does not, by definition, apply to private speech 
that takes place on public grounds. Thus, much of the argument in 
Pleasant Grove centered on whether the city has “adopted” or 
“effectively controlled” the message of the Fraternal Order of Eagles’ 
monument by displaying it in Pioneer Park. Were this truly the only 
issue in play, however, it would seem that Pleasant Grove had an easy 
way out: simply pass an ordinance or install a placard adopting the Ten 
Commandments monument as its own speech. This would have removed 
all doubt as to whether the monument falls under the government speech 
rule—but Pleasant Grove resolutely refused to take either action. Why? 
The obvious answer is that such an explicit endorsement of the 
Decalogue would raise serious Establishment Clause concerns. Although 
Alito’s opinion studiously avoids this question, its long-term 
significance was not lost on others on the Court. While Antonin Scalia 
and Clarence Thomas blustered in concurrence that “[t]he city ought not 
fear that today’s victory has propelled it from the Free Speech Clause 
frying pan into the Establishment Clause fire,”4 John Paul Stevens and 
Ruth Ginsburg seemed quietly pleased—perhaps even confident—about 
the potential future implications: “For even if the Free Speech Clause 
neither restricts nor protects government speech, government speakers 
are bound by the Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those 
supplied by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.”5 To 
understand what is really at stake here—to put Scalia’s Gertrudian 
protest and Stevens’ Machiavellian calm in context—it is worth taking a 
brief look at the unsettled state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
When it incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states in 
1947, the Court both adopted a doctrine of state “neutrality” towards 
religion and made an explicit choice about the practical shape this 
neutrality would take: “Neither a state nor the Federal government can . . 
. pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one 
3 PETA v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
4 Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1139 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
5 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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religion over another.”6 To be neutral, then, the state must exclude all 
religion from government speech or aid programs. This “exclusive” 
conception of neutrality met with immediate opposition, however, from 
those who claimed that the doctrine actually establishes a secular 
viewpoint at the expense of all others. And so, just five years later, a 
different vision of neutrality briefly captured a majority of the Court: 
“When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with 
religious authorities . . . . it then respects the religious nature of our 
people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To 
hold that it may not would . . . . be preferring those who believe in no 
religion over those who do believe.”7 But this “inclusive” version of 
neutrality—which sees the state as neutral when it includes or 
accommodates all religious views equally—did not long hold sway. A 
decade later the Court excluded nondenominational prayer from public 
schools,8 and it has since applied exclusivism to strike down moments 
of silence, nondenominational graduate prayers, public funding for 
Catholic school field trips, and tax benefits to parochial school parents.9
But inclusivism has remained alive—simmering just below the 
surface in Potter Stewart’s dissents in the school prayer decisions—and 
has reemerged, cloaked in free expression robes, in a series of cases 
running from Widmar v. Vincent, through Lamb’s Chapel v. Center for 
Moriches Union Free School District and Rosenberger v. University of 
Virginia, to Good News Club v. Milford Central School.10 In these 
decisions the Court has held that, the Establishment Clause 
notwithstanding, the Free Speech Clause prevents the government from 
discriminating against groups with a religious viewpoint when allocating 
resources for use as, or in, a public forum—so long as the government 
itself does not endorse a particular religious message. In this way, 
inclusivists on the Court have begun to chip away at the exclusivist wall 
of separation by suggesting that some forms of exclusivism are 
tantamount to a denial of free speech. While not unnoticed, these efforts 
6 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
7 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952). 
8 See Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
9 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); 
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
10 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Ctr. for Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 
454 U.S. 263 (1981); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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have remained underpublicized; but they continue to present puzzling 
doctrinal problems. Summum’s near certain follow-up appeal on 
Establishment Clause grounds—which Scalia is at unseemly pains to 
prevent—threatens to expose these problems in the months ahead. 
From the outside looking in, this two-step litigation tactic has the 
appearance of a well conceived divide-and-conquer strategy. If the Good 
News approach has been to muddy the Establishment water with Free 
Speech analysis, Pleasant Grove seeks to clarify each clause and its 
derivative doctrine separately. The first step forces the Court to 
acknowledge the true parameters of Free Speech in a public forum; thus 
the recent decision reaffirms that a public entity that sponsors a 
particular viewpoint—while excluding others—must actually endorse 
that viewpoint as “government speech.” The second step, presumably, 
will ask the Court to decide whether the Establishment Clause permits 
“government speech” that presents a particular religious viewpoint. This 
is precisely the doctrinal problem that Thomas papers over in his Good 
News opinion, cryptically suggesting that, “it is not clear whether a 
State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would 
justify viewpoint discrimination.”11 It is this very clarity that Pleasant 
Grove would seem to demand. By taking these issues apart and 
resolving them separately, Summum’s advocates may yet demonstrate 
that Scalia and Thomas cannot have their constitutional cake and eat it 
too: If there is room at the public forum for the Good News Club, there 
must also be room for Summum. 
The view from the inside must seem equally troubling, at least 
judging from Chief Justice John Roberts’s very first question to the 
petitioners at oral argument: “[Y]ou’re really just picking your poison, 
aren’t you? I mean, the more you say that the monument is Government 
speech to get out of the . . . Free Speech Clause, the more it seems to me 
you’re walking into a trap under the Establishment Clause.”12 Scalia 
expressed similar unease with the respondents: “You will say just the 
opposite when you come back here to challenge the Ten 
Commandments monument . . . on Establishment Clause grounds. You 
will say something like this: Anybody who comes into this park and sees 
this monument owned by the Government, on Government land, will 
11 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114. 
12 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 
1125 (2009) (No. 07-665). 
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think that the Government is endorsing the message.”13 Indeed, by 
invoking the government speech rule based on these facts, the Court 
would effectively kick out the doctrinal leg upon which the 
Widmar/Good News cases stand—the idea that the state does not 
endorse religious speech simply by opening its doors to religious 
viewpoints on an equal basis. The only Establishment defense then left 
to the inclusivists—derived from 2005’s Van Orden v. Perry—is to 
argue that the state is only endorsing the Ten Commandments’ 
“historical meaning” to Pleasant Grove; not the religious message.14 
This is the tack that Scalia has preemptively taken in concurrence: 
“Even accepting the narrowest reading of the narrowest opinion 
necessary to the judgment in Van Orden, there is little basis to 
distinguish the monument in this case . . . .”15 But, in truth, this is a 
flimsy doctrine fraught with peril; it transparently prefers well 
established or “historically significant” religions—likely to be local 
majorities—to newer minority groups. And it is unclear that this frail 
fiction can survive recent turnover on the bench—neither Alito nor 
Roberts took the opportunity to sign on here. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to imagine the Court overturning a case 
decided just four years ago, but—Scalia’s wishful thinking 
notwithstanding—a direct repudiation of Van Orden hardly seems 
necessary. Stephen Breyer’s concurrence was the swing vote in that 
decision (the aforementioned “narrowest opinion”) and in it he made 
clear that the fundamental inquiry in such “borderline cases” must be 
whether the outcome “assure[s] the fullest possible scope of religious 
liberty and tolerance for all,” and prevents “divisiveness based upon 
religion that promotes social conflict . . . .”16 He concluded that the 
particular context of the monument at issue in Van Orden made its 
message “predominantly secular” and “unlikely to prove divisive,” thus 
placing it narrowly “on the permissible side of the constitutional line . . 
. .”17 Given the peculiar facts and implications of Pleasant Grove, 
however, Breyer’s fundamental inquiry could easily yield different 
results. Indeed, Scalia’s recent concurrence practically begs a troubling 
hypothetical: What if the city had accepted Summum’s monument, and 
13 Id. at 47. 
14 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005). 
15 Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
16 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698, 700 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
17 Id. at 702, 704. 
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now faced an Establishment Clause challenge from a local Christian 
group? Given the decisive importance Scalia wants to place on a 
monument’s historical meaning or significance, such a challenge would 
seem likely to succeed. But a doctrine that finds the Ten 
Commandments constitutional, yet would hold the Ten Commandments 
plus the Seven Aphorisms unconstitutional, hardly seems to assure the 
fullest scope of “tolerance for all”18—nor, truth be told, does it mesh 
particularly well with Establishment inclusivism. And because such an 
approach actually threatens to encourage religious divisiveness, it does 
not seem sympathetic to Breyer’s calculus. For now, the once and future 
swing voter was careful not to give anything away, saying in 
concurrence only that we must treat the “‘government speech’ doctrine 
[as] a rule of thumb, not a rigid category.”19
Thus Pleasant Grove, in both its current and future manifestations, 
seems poised to cut at least part way through the now tangled strands of 
First Amendment doctrine. In what is likely a deliberate, two-step 
litigation strategy, Summum has brought the Court to a potentially 
transformative Establishment crossroads. For his part, David Souter, 
another pivotal voter on this issue, clearly sees the coming storm: 
“[While] Establishment Clause issues have been neither raised nor 
briefed before us, there is no doubt that this case and its government 
speech claim has been litigated by the parties with one eye on the 
Establishment Clause. The interaction between the ‘government speech 
doctrine’ and Establishment Clause principles has not, however, begun 
to be worked out.”20 This call to begin “work[ing] out” the relevant 
Establishment principles certainly tempers Scalia’s loud confidence in 
Van Orden, and, when combined with Stevens and Ginsburg’s quiet 
contentment and Roberts and Alito’s abstinence, Souter’s concurrence 
may signal a sea change in favor of Establishment exclusivists. At the 
very least, Summum Ra (and perhaps others) will have the pleasure of 
seeing the Court’s conservatives squirm through a doctrinal minefield of 
their own making. 
 
18 Id. 700. 
19 Pleasant Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 1140 (Breyer, J. concurring). 
20 Id. at 1141 (Souter, J., concurring). 
